% Tails — Privacy for anyone anywhere
% intrigeri
% June, 2014
What what who
=============
Who I am
--------
* Tails contributor
* Debian developer
What is Tails
-------------
**T**he **A**mnesic **I**ncognito **L**ive **S**ystem
A Live operating system
-----------------------
* works on (almost) any computer
* boots off a DD, a USB stick, or a SD card
Preserving privacy and anonymity #1
-----------------------------------
* use the Internet anonymously and circumvent censorship:
all connections to the Internet are forced to go through the Tor network
* leave no trace on the computer you are using unless you ask it
explicitly
Preserving privacy and anonymity #2
-----------------------------------
* cryptographic tools:
encrypt your files, emails and instant messaging
* media production tools:
sound, video, office publishing, graphics...
Other features
--------------
* exists since 2009
* translated into many languages
* Free Software, public and open development:
Git, Redmine, meetings and roadmap
* design documentation :
And... it works?
----------------
> * According to the NSA, yes :
> "(S//REL) Tails: Complete Bootable OS on CD for anonymity - includes Tor
> (S//REL) Adds Severe CNE misery to equation"
> (Thanks to a famous Tails user for providing these documents.)
> * Bruce Schneier, December 2013 :
> "What do I trust? I trust, I trust Tails, I trust GPG [...]"
> "I don't use Linux. (Shhh. Don't tell anyone.)
> Although I have started using Tails""
Usability: a security feature
=============================
Our starting point
------------------
* privacy and anonymity: collective matters
* more secure tool, but less usable
⇒ collectively, less security
Our hypothesis
--------------
Often usability matters more than "pure" security.
Make a "baseline" security level (privacy, anonymity) very accessible
⇒ Tails is widely used
⇒ more contributors
⇒ energy ↗ to improve security without decreasing usability
Examples
--------
* GNOME desktop
* desktop cryptographic tools (Seahorse, OpenPGP applet, GNOME Disks)
* integrates the "Spoof MAC address, or not" decision in
a user-friendly way
* documentation
* translations
* warnings
* WhisperBack
A small delta, to avoid drowning
================================
## History lesson
Often, specialized distributions die quickly.
At least in this area.
✝ Haven, Anonym.OS, ParanoidLinux, onionOS, Phantomix and
many others. RIP.
## Why?
* small teams, not organized to grow
* underestimation of the maintenance and user support work
* no long-term commitment
* NIH
## Our hypothesis
* focus on maintainability
* avoid having a delta that grows too much, or too fast, wrt. our upstreams
## Examples: what we did not do internally
... despite pressure:
* grsecurity
* compile-time hardening
## Examples: what we did internally
... but should share:
* OpenPGP applet
* erasing memory on shutdown
## Examples: what we're doing upstream
* AppArmor
* libvirt
* Seahorse
* Debian
* Debian Live
* fix OTR downgrade → v1
Consequences #1
---------------
* little Tails-specific code
* glue work
* "social" work:
talk to upstreams
spread the word about our needs
find skilled people to do the work at the best place
* slow rhythm (waiting the next Debian release, and sometimes the one
after), despite backports
Consequences #2
---------------
And, above all...
. . .
*Tails is still alive!*
Challenges
==========
Cadence & popularity
--------------------
- new release every 6 weeks
- about 10k boots a day, doubles every 6-9 months
Limited resources and time
--------------------------
- mostly volunteer work
- 2000 commits, by ~10 persons, on the last 6 months
Roadmap
=======
Overview
--------
> * welcome more varied contributions
> * ... from more varied people
> * make our life easier
> * make Tails (even) more usable
> * better protect users against targeted attacks
This summer
-----------
> - **Tails 1.1** — July 22: Debian Wheezy, UEFI
And then
--------
- **Tails 2.0**: sustainability and maintainability
Greeter
same-day security updates
mitigate effects of security holes
- **Tails 3.0**: hardening, sandboxing
- More?
Tails needs you, for...
=======================
## Translation
Translators can allow more people around the world to use Tails.
## Documentation
Good writers can make Tails accessible to more people.
* #6318: Fix key trusting instructions to work when we update our signing key
* #6469: Document the workflow to upgrade Tails from ISO using 2 USB sticks
## Tests
Early testers help improve Tails quality.
* #5174: Test Pidgin SSL validation in Debian unstable
* #5709: Test OnionCat unidirectional mode for VoIP
## Design
Web and graphics designers can make Tails easier to use and
more appealing.
* #7258: Make the logos on the homepage clickable
* #6323: Improve the CSS of the boxed titles
* #6361: Create a stylesheet for the contributor's role
## Usability
User interface and user experience experts can make Tails easier to
use and more appealing.
* #7437: Design a progress indicator while establishing a connection to Tor
* #6417: Evaluate Tails Greeter revamp proposals
## Code
Software people with very diverse skills can improve Tails.
* #5917: tails-greeter password field : Warn when caps-lock in ON
* #6918: Track hardening status of the binaries shipped in Tails
* #5881: Add reboot button to persistence setup assistant
## Infrastructure
System administrators can improve the development and quality
assurance processes.
* #6295: Evaluate consequences of importing large amounts of packages into reprepro
* #6891: Monitor broken links on our website
## Debian
One can improve Tails (and other Debian derivatives, such as
Freepto ;) by contributing to Debian.
* AppArmor ()
* #6507: Package our OpenPGP applet for Debian
* #7352: Backport ruby-libvirt 0.5+ for Wheezy
## Money
Those who have too much money can speed up the development of Tails.
## Where to start?
*
* "easy" tasks
## Tell us about your skills and desires,
we'll help you get started :)
Contact
=======
## Talk to us
* I'm here.
* Development mailing-list: ****
* Mailing-list for translators: ****
* Early testers mailing-list: ****
* Private and encrypted mailing-list: ****
* IRC: see
* Web: ****